We show how an upstream …rm by using a price-dependent pro…t-sharing rule can prevent destructive competition between downstream …rms that produce relatively close substitutes. With this rule the upstream …rm induces the retailers to behave as if demand has become less price elastic. As a result, competing downstream …rms will maximize aggregate total channel pro…t. When downstream …rms are better informed about demand conditions than the upstream …rm, the same outcome cannot be achieved by vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance (RPM). Price-dependent pro…t-sharing may also ensure that the downstream …rms undertake e¢ cient market expanding investments. The model is consistent with observations from the market for content commodities distributed by mobile networks.
Introduction
The Bertrand paradox may provide a plausible explanation of why the majority of the content commodities on the internet are o¤ered for free (marginal costs). The rival is just "one click away", and competing content providers have strong incentives to undercut each other as long as there are positive pro…t margins.
In recent years mobile phone operators have allowed content providers to sell content commodities like ringtones, football goal alerts and jokes to the mobile subscribers. Similar to the internet, the entry barriers for providers of content commodities are low, and the rival is just "one click away" also for mobile content commodities. However, in contrast to what we have observed on the internet, mobile content commodities are not o¤ered for free. End-user prices are well above marginal costs.
The vertical channel structure for mobile content di¤ers from what is observed in the internet. In contrast to the internet, the (upstream) mobile access provider may use vertical restraints to reduce or eliminate competing content providers'undercutting incentives. One potential explanation why the Bertrand paradox is not observed for such mobile content commodities, is the price-dependent pro…t-sharing rule used as a vertical restraint by some upstream mobile providers. With this rule each content provider decides the end-user price for the good he sells, but he has to pay a share of the end-user price to the upstream …rms in order to get access to the customers on the mobile networks. The crucial feature of the rule is that it is progressive, in the sense that the share maintained by the content provider is increasing in the end-user price. Table 1 shows the pro…t-sharing rule used by the dominant Norwegian mobile operator Telenor. If a content provider sells his good for NOK 3, say, he receives 62 % of the revenue, while he only receives 45 % of the revenue if he reduces the price to NOK 1.
End-user price (NOK) 1.0 1.5 3 5 10 20 70
Share to the content provider 45% 54.% 62% 66% 68% 70% 80% A progressive pro…t-sharing rule implies that the opportunity cost of setting a low end-user price is relatively high, and this reduces the incentives to engage in …erce price competition. More speci…cally, in the formal model we show how an upstream …rm can use such a rule to reduce the content providers' undercutting incentives by lowering their perceived elasticity of demand. Thereby the upstream …rm can prevent destructive price competition. Even more interestingly, we show that a progressive pro…t-sharing rule achieves higher aggregate channel pro…t than alternatives where the upstream …rm partly or fully dictates the end-user prices (e.g. through resale price maintenance, RPM). This is true if we make the realistic assumption that the content providers are better informed about the demand for their goods than is the upstream …rm (asymmetric information).
The labeling of the mobile provider as an upstream …rm and the content providers as downstream …rms is not clear-cut in the present channel structure. The mobile access provider o¤ers market access for multiple content providers. We choose to label the content providers as downstream …rms, since they decide retail pricing and have more accurate information about retail demand conditions than the upstream mobile provider.
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The question of how vertical restraints can help solve channel coordination problems has received much attention in the literature. Under di¤erent assumptions on the channel structure McGuire and Staelin (1983) , Sha¤er (1991) , Ingene and Parry (1995) , Desai (2000) and Kuksov and Pazgal (2007) among others, show that a two-part tari¤ may be used to prevent destructive downstream price competition.
However, our proposed pro…t-sharing rule achieves higher aggregate channel pro…t 1 However, in comparable channel structures it may be more appropriate to label content providers as upstream …rms and access providers as downstream …rms. One example is the book publishing industry. When considering the relationship between a publisher and Amazon.com, the latter decides retail pricing and probably also has superior information about the retail demand conditions (and will in this sense be in the same marketing position as the content providers in our settting). A similar information asymmetry may also be found in other industries where downstream …rms have superior hands-on market knowledge. One example is chains consisting of a large number of geographically dispersed outlets, and where local knowledge is hard to obtain for the upstream headquarters.
compared to a two-part tari¤ if the downstream …rms have more accurate information about demand than the upstream …rm.
In an extension of the basic model, we allow the downstream …rms to make market-expanding investments that cannot be directly and perfectly controlled by the upstream …rm (for instance because the latter has insu¢ cient information about the market potential). The investment levels might then be too high or too low compared to the levels which maximize channel pro…t (e.g. Telser, 1960) . Such lack of control may give rise to horizontal and vertical externalities, and there exists a sizeable literature on how vertical restraints can help solve channel coordination problems. One strand of the literature focuses on how to …nd the minimum number of vertical restraints su¢ cient to maximize total channel pro…t. Mathewson and Winter (1984) show how a combination of a two-part tari¤ and RPM may be used to achieve the integrated channel outcome where retailers undertake market expanding sales e¤ort with potential spillovers. Lal (1990) shows that revenue-sharing may be used as an additional instrument to a two-part tari¤ in a context where upstream and downstream …rms undertake non-contractible sales e¤orts (see also Rao and Srinivasan,1995) .
Another strand of the literature, pioneered by Rey and Tirole (1986) , emphasizes that both the private and social desirability of a given vertical restraint depend on the underlying delegation problem. They compare RPM and exclusive territories (ET) under uncertainty about demand or cost. Our starting point, too, is the underlying delegation problem; the retailers have more accurate demand information than the manufacturer. We also follow Rey and Tirole (op cit) in that we do not search for the minimum su¢ cient number of vertical restraints inducing the same pro…t outcome as under channel integration. Rather we show how the price-dependent pro…t-sharing rule may be used to suppress the competing retailers' undercutting incentives, and, furthermore, that this restraint may be superior to alternatives such as RPM.
In contrast to our approach, Lal (1990) and recent papers like Cachon and Lariviere (2005) , Dana and Spier (2001) , and Mortimer (2008) , consider a revenue sharing scheme that speci…es …xed rather than price-dependent shares to the manufacturer and the retailer (e.g. 60% to the manufacturer and 40 % to the retailer). Like our paper, Cachon and Lariviere (2005) , Dana and Spier (2001), and Mortimer (2008) are motivated by observed contracts. These papers focus on revenue-sharing contracts implemented in the video rental industry, and show how revenue-sharing schemes may be used to solve channel coordinating problems related to inventory choices.
In the next section we present a case study of how the price-dependent pro…t-sharing rule has been used in practise, and in Section 3 we set up a formal model to show how an optimal pro…t-sharing rule may induce competing content providers to choose end-user prices that maximize aggregate channel pro…t. In Section 4 we extend the model to allow each downstream …rm to undertake non-contractible market expanding investments (e.g. marketing) with potential spillovers, and Section 5 concludes.
2 A price-dependent pro…t-sharing rule -used in and weather forecasts. The mobile access providers themselves decided which types of services that should be o¤ered and they also took care of end-user pricing. However, this model of vertical integration did not seem to work very well; the services generated limited revenues and pro…t.
In 2000, the two mobile providers voluntarily shifted strategy from in-house development and production of content to one of vertical separation. With this business model independent content providers behave as downstream …rms ("retailers") responsible for sales e¤ort, marketing, and end-user pricing, while the mobile providers act as upstream …rms providing access to the customers (the mobile subscribers) as an input. The mobile providers o¤er take-it-or-leave-it wholesale contracts, specifying a menu of end-user prices among which the content providers may choose (ranging from NOK 1 to NOK 60). Moreover, the wholesale contract speci…es the revenue split between the mobile provider and the content provider, where the share to the content provider increases with the end-user price (cf. Table   1 above).
Note that there is no competition between the mobile providers in the upstream market for content messaging. In order to gain access to Telenor's customers, a provider of content message services needs an agreement with Telenor, and, similarly, the content provider needs an agreement with NetCom in order to reach NetCom's customers. We have observed a high degree of cooperation between NetCom and
Telenor. 4 In April 2000 the two mobile network providers launched a mechanism that to a large extent was a common wholesale concept towards content message providers. The outcome is that every mobile phone subscriber may access the same content messaging services at the same price independent of which provider they 4 One example is the introduction of common shortcodes. It is important for the content provider to have the same number for all the mobile operators to facilitate marketing to all users. One of the most important content messages has been TV-related text-messaging where viewers vote and send comments. For such services it is important that the providers o¤er common shortcodes independent …rms is now widely adopted in Europe and Asia (Strand, 2004) .
The motivation behind the mobile providers'delegation of retail pricing and marketing was that small and independent content providers appeared to have superior hands-on market knowledge (Nielsen and Aanestad, 2006) . Consequently, there is a potential gain from delegation since decisions on marketing, retail pricing and introduction of new services may be based on more accurate demand information when undertaken by independent content providers rather than by the mobile providers themselves. In the formal model below, we thus assume that the source of the delegation problem is that independent downstream …rms have more accurate demand information than the upstream …rm.
By providing a standard interface and allowing for free entry for content providers, the mobile environment resembles what we have observed in the internet. As Shapiro and Varian (1998) put it: "Any idiot can establish a Web presence -and lots of them have". In 2004, approximately 50 di¤erent companies were active in providing content messaging services in Norway (Nielsen and Aanestad, 2006) . Due to low entry barriers and the fact that the services may easily be replicated by rivals, the vast majority of the content messaging services may be considered as commodities. However, a remarkable di¤erence from the internet is that competition among providers of content messaging services has not driven prices down to marginal costs.
In Figure 1 we have the monthly average prices for content messages in the period It is interesting to note that income from content messaging in the Norwegian mobile networks in 2004 was twice as high as the revenues from internet ads. 6 Since content commodities are o¤ered for free on the internet, advertising is the only revenue source for the majority of internet content providers. Our conjecture is that the gross willingness to pay is signi…cantly higher for content commodities available on the internet than for mobile content commodities like ringtones and jokes. As total revenues are higher for mobile content commodities than for internet content commodities, this indicates that a signi…cantly higher share of the potential channel pro…t is extracted from mobile content commodities than from internet content commodities.
Unfortunately, we only have detailed information about the Norwegian market, and cannot compare the outcome for mobile content messaging with and without the price-dependent pro…t sharing rule. Anecdotal evidence is, however, consistent from total revenue/number of messages. We have no data on content messages bought by the customers of the other Norwegian mobile provider NetCom. However, since the content providers charge the same end-user price independent of which of the two mobile providers the customer subscribes to, it seems reasonable to assume that the pattern in Figure 1 holds 
The model
We consider an upstream …rm that sells access to distribution facilities to n downstream …rms. The demand curve faced by downstream …rm i = 1; :::; n is given by
; where a is a demand parameter and p is the vector of prices charged by the n downstream …rms. 7 The demand parameter a is known by the downstream …rms when they set end-user prices. The upstream …rm knows that a is distributed on the interval [a; a], but does not know its exact level. 8 We assume that the demand functions are well behaved and downward sloping in own price (@q i =@p i < 0). The consumers perceive the goods sold by the downstream …rms as imperfect substitutes
Marginal costs both at the upstream and downstream levels are set equal to zero, but this does not matter for the qualitative results (see discussion at the end of this section). Hence, we can write total operating pro…t in the industry as
Below, we consider a two-stage game where the upstream …rm at stage 1 determines the wholesale conditions, and where the downstream …rms subsequently 7 With linear demand curves a is simply the intercept with the price axis. 8 We should emphasize that the upstream …rm may also have superior demand information compared to the downstream …rm regarding e.g. new product introduction. Chu (1992) , Lariviere and Padmanabhan, (1997) , Desai and Srinivasan (1995) , and Desai (2000), among others, analyze demand screening and signaling where the manufacturer has private information about e.g. product quality. This has been given attention; not least in the grocery markets where screening and signaling have been considered as potential explanations for the existence of slotting allowances.
compete in prices. Later, we shall investigate the consequences of allowing the downstream …rms to make market-expanding investments.
The upstream …rm uses a pro…t-sharing rule where downstream …rm i keeps a share (p i ) > 0 of its operating pro…t, while the upstream …rm gets the share
The literature conventionally assumes that the pro…t share is a constant;
i.e. 0 = 0 (see e.g. Lal, 1990) . However, below we show that when the downstream …rms produce (imperfect) substitutes, it is optimal for the upstream …rm to choose 0 > 0: This means that the share accruing to each downstream …rm is increasing in its end-user price. We label this as a price-dependent pro…t-sharing rule.
For the following analysis it is convenient to make the following de…nition:
The function i ( ) is the elasticity of the pro…t share with respect to downstream …rm i's price. Note that i is positive if and only if
Stage 2 The pro…t level of downstream …rm i equals
where f i is a …xed fee to the upstream …rm.
At the last stage each …rm solves p i = arg max i : Using the de…nition i
p i ; this yields the …rst-order conditions (FOCs)
If is constant we have 0 = i = 0: In this case merely determines how operating pro…ts are split between the upstream and the downstream …rms, and it does not a¤ect the latters'pricing decisions. This is clear from equation (3), where the second term vanishes if i = 0: We then get the textbook result that a pro…t maximizing
implying that we end up in a standard Bertrand game:
With i > 0 the second term on the left-hand side of equation (3) is positive, such that the marginal pro…t at any given price is higher than if i = 0:
Proposition 1: The downstream …rms' pro…t-maximizing prices are higher for i > 0 compared to i = 0:
as the price elasticity of demand for good i; we can rewrite …rst-order condition (3) as
Equation (4) characterizes the pro…t-maximizing equilibrium price for …rm i: It is well known that revenue -and thus pro…t for a …rm facing zero marginal costs -is maximized by choosing a price for which the elasticity is equal to minus one, other things equal. However, if i > 0 we see from (4) that the pro…t sharing rule induces the downstream service provider to behave as if demand has become less price elastic:
Proposition 2: A price-dependent pro…t-sharing rule with i > 0 reduces the perceived elasticity of demand for the downstream …rms, making them behave less aggressively.
Stage 1
The upstream …rm will use i to induce the downstream …rms to set prices that maximize total channel pro…t. The optimal price-dependent pro…t-sharing rule is characterized by its price elasticity. To …nd the optimal rule we …rst derive the hypothetical equilibrium with vertical integration (V I) and complete information about the demand parameter a. Solving p i = arg max (p) yields the FOCs
The term in the square bracket of (5) measures the marginal pro…t on good i and is analogous to the term in the square bracket of (3). The second term of (5) internalizes the horizontal pecuniary externality when products are imperfect substitutes; other things equal, each downstream …rm has incentives to set a relatively low end-user price in order to steal business from its competitors. Since the size of this business-stealing e¤ect is larger the less di¤erentiated the downstream goods,
we shall now introduce ! p ji as a measure of the degree of substitutability between services o¤ered by the downstream …rms:
Hence, ! p ji measures by how much demand for good j increases per unit reduction in demand for good i when p i increases: In total, the (n 1) rivals of …rm i will consequently increase their output by X j6 =i
The larger ! p ji is, the higher p i should be set in order to maximize aggregate channel pro…t, other things equal. The challenge for the upstream …rm in a vertically separated market structure is to set wholesale conditions that induce the downstream …rms to internalize this e¤ect at stage 2.
Inserting for ! p ji into (5) we can now characterize industry optimum as
By imposing symmetry this expression can be reformulated as
Note that ! p ji = 0 if the goods are completely unrelated in demand: On the other hand, if the goods are nearly perfect substitutes, the reduced demand for good i due to an increase in p i enlarges total demand for all the other goods by (almost) the same amount. Hence, since …rm i has (n 1) rivals, each of them will sell approximately 1=(n 1) units more per unit reduction of q i . In the limiting case where the goods are perfect substitutes, we have ! p ji = 1=(n 1); making the square bracket in (8) equal to zero. 9 In the following we shall assume that there is at least a perceivable di¤erentiation between the goods, implying that ! p ji 2 [0; 1=(n 1)i:We can then solve (8) with respect to " ii to …nd that the actual price elasticity of demand for each good in channel optimum equals
Inserting for " ii into (4) implies that the upstream …rm should set i according
In general, the derivatives @q j =@p i and @q i =p i depend on the price of the goods.
However, for a wide class of utility functions this is not true for the ratio ! p ji = (@q j =@p i ) = (@q i =@p i ), since we have the following result:
Proposition 3: For any homothetic utility function, ! p ji is independent of output and prices in a symmetric equilibrium.
Proof: See Technical Appendix.
The important message from Proposition 3 is that with symmetry and homothetic utility the upstream …rm only needs information about the degree of substitutability, as measured by (6), and not about the size of the market. Homothethic utility is su¢ cient, but not necessary, for this result. It will also hold true for quasilinear quadratic utility functions as they yield demand functions that are linear in prices.
In order to steal business from its competitors, each downstream …rm would, other things equal, have incentives to set a lower price than the one which maximizes aggregate channel pro…t (since @ (p i q i ) @p i < 0 if the goods are substitutes). However, if the upstream …rm uses the pro…t-sharing rule with i = > 0; each downstream …rm will fully internalize the e¤ect its price has on the pro…t of the other …rms.
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10 The underlying assumption here is that the upstream …rm has accurate information on price sensitivities in the downstream market, but not on market size. One motivation for this may be that the upstream …rm through its market position is able to learn how the downstream market responds to price competition. As to market size, the upstream …rm may have an idea about the total potential, whereas the downstream …rm knows how much of the market potential it is able to capture.
Hence, the downstream …rms will avoid destructive price competition also in cases where the goods are minimally di¤erentiated. 11 Only in the special case where a price reduction of good i does not a¤ect demand for good j, do we have ! p ji = = 0:
12
We can state
Proposition 4: The pro…t-sharing rule with i = induces downstream prices that maximize aggregate channel pro…t.
The upstream …rm might use a …xed fee (f i ) to capture pro…ts from the downstream …rms. The problem is that the determination of f i must be based on some expectation of the size of the market. If the upstream …rm charges a relatively high …xed fee, the downstream …rms will not enter the market unless actual demand is su¢ ciently large. Then the industry will not be operative even if it should be intrinsically pro…table. If the upstream …rm sets a relatively low …xed fee, on the other hand, it will capture only a small share of total industry pro…t if actual demand is high.
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To circumvent this problem, the upstream …rm can set f i = 0 and use another instrument to redistribute pro…ts. As an example, suppose that the upstream …rm sets (p i ) = p i ; where is a positive constant. The pro…t function of downstream …rm i can then be written as i = p i p i q i : Thus the upstream …rm can set arbitrarily close to zero (such that it becomes close to 100 per cent of aggregate 11 Suppose that the goods are actually perfect substitutes. The upstream …rm could then o¤er each downstream …rm the contract i = p i q i f i ; where the …xed fee is f i = " (where " is an arbitrarily small number). If two or more downstream …rms enter the industry, the equilibrium price will be equal to zero, in which case they cannot cover the …xed fee. However, by setting su¢ ciently above zero to ensure that i > 0 one, and only one, downstream …rm will …nd it pro…table to enter the industry. As there are then no competing content providers, this …rm will set an output price which maximizes aggregate pro…t. Note also that the lower is, the higher is the share of the pro…ts that accrues to the upstream …rm.
12 If the downstream goods were complements, optimal channel coordination would require a pro…t-sharing function that is decreasing in prices ( < 0): 13 If the upstream …rm chooses to use a …xed fee to capture pro…ts from the downstream …rms, it will have to maximize its own pro…t with respect to and f , taking into account the fact that an otherwise pro…table industry is less likely to be operative the higher f is channel pro…t), and still ensure that the downstream …rms are operative for any positive market demand. It should be noted, though, that since is multiplied by p i p i q i instead of by p i q i ; the upstream …rm cannot choose a value of that guarantees it a given percentage of the channel pro…t.
14 What about other types of vertical restraints? The source of the problem is that the downstream …rms know the actual size of the market, while the upstream …rm only has an expectation about demand. The novelty of the price-dependent pro…t-sharing rule is its ability to ensure that competing downstream …rms individually choose end-user prices which maximize total channel pro…t. The pro…t-sharing rule is thus more e¤ective than alternatives that do not imply delegation of end-user pricing, such as RPM. The present proposal is also more e¤ective than several other alternatives even if these entail delegation of retail pricing. The most obvious example is one where the upstream …rms set a unit wholesale price that may deviate from the marginal costs. By increasing the unit wholesale price above the marginal costs (which are zero in the present model), the downstream …rms will increase end-user prices. However, analogous to RPM, the upstream …rm must determine the unit wholesale price based on expected rather than actual market size. Thus, it follows from Proposition 3 that we have the following result:
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Proposition 5: Assume that only the downstream …rms know the accurate level of a. The pro…t-sharing rule where i = is then superior to vertical restraints 14 Suppose that the upstream …rm wants to extract 50 % of the channel pro…t, which means that p = 0:5: We then …nd that it would have to set = (1=2) (p ) : The problem is, however, that due to the demand uncertainty at stage 1 the upstream …rm does not know p : Thus, it is also unable to calculate : We would like to thank one of the referees for pointing this out to us. 15 It should be noted that an e¢ cient implementation of exclusive clauses (exclusive dealing or exclusive territory) may resemble the current outcome. However, in many markets it is di¢ cult to enforce exclusive contracts, and such exclusive contracts imply that the upstream …rm picks the …rms/services that will be allowed to enter the retail market. Such restrictions on entry will in many circumstances have signi…cant disadvantages. In fact, in the case of content messaging discussed above, one of the key features behind the success seems to be that there are no such restrictions on entry. The strategy of letting a thousand ‡owers bloom has ensured a wide variety of services which has made the system attractive for the consumers and pro…table for the industry.
(such as RPM) that require the upstream …rm to know the size of the market in order to achieve maximum channel pro…t.
To clearly see the intuition behind the result in Proposition 5, we look at a speci…c example. Our example is based on the Shubik-Levitan (1980) utility function:
U (q 1 ::; q i ; ::; q n ) = a
The parameter a > 0 in equation (10) is a measure of the market potential, q i is the quantity from retailer i, and n 2 the number of retailers. The parameter s 2 [0; 1)
is a measure of how di¤erentiated the services are; from the consumers'point of view they are closer substitutes the higher s: The merit of using this particular utility function is that the size of the market does not vary with s.
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Solving @U=@q i p i = 0 for i = 1; ::::; n, we …nd
When marginal costs are zero, it is straight forward to show that the price which maximizes total channel pro…ts is p = a=2 for i = 1; ::::; n. By using (6) and (11), we …nd that ! p ji = s= (n s). Equation (9) then implies that = s (n 1) = [n(1 s)] : This generates an aggregate channel pro…t equal to = 1 4 a 2 ; which is …rst-best from the industry's point of view.
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In the absence of uncertainty there is actually no need for the upstream …rm to delegate retail pricing to the downstream …rms. Abstracting from any legal considerations, the upstream …rm might for instance use RPM and set p = a=2 (and redistribute pro…ts through a …xed fee). Alternatively, a two-part tari¤, consisting 16 Other authors using the Shubik-Levitan framework to analyze vertical restraints include Sha¤er (1991) and Motta (2004) . 17 From (11) we see that the derivatives @q i =@p i and @q j =@p i are independent of quantities.
This is a special feature of linear demand functions, which does not hold in general. However, Proposition 3 makes it clear that the ratio ! p ij -which is the only market feature that matters for the upstream …rm's choice of -is independent of quantities and prices, also for the class of homothetic utility functions. of a wholesale unit price w i and a …xed fee f i , could be used. To see the latter, suppose that there are two downstream …rms, each having pro…ts equal to i = (p i w i )q i f i .
18 Then the upstream …rm ensures that the downstream …rms choose p = a=2 by setting
Note that dw=ds > 0: The reason for this is that the closer substitutes the downstream products are , the more …ercly the downstream …rms will compete. In particular, there will be perfect competition between the downstream …rms in the limit where s ! 1; and in this case we therefore have p = w = a=2: If s = 0; on the other hand, each downstream …rm is a de facto monopoly in the end-user market.
The upstream …rms will then induce them to choose p = a=2 by setting w equal to marginal costs (which we have normalized to zero).
To see the superiority of the pro…t-sharing rule when only the downstream …rms know the actual size of the market, suppose that the upstream …rm's best estimate of the size of the market is that a is uniformly distributed on [a; a] : Expected demand is thus equal to a e = (a + a)=2: With the pro…t-sharing rule, the expected industry pro…t from the upstream …rm's point of view is consequently given by
Also under RPM the upstream …rm is fully capable of internalizing the price competition between the …rms, such that the end-user price p RP M will be independent of s. However, since the upstream …rm does not know the exact size of the market, it will set p RP M = a e =2 (see Technical Appendix): This price will be higher than the one which maximizes aggregate channel pro…t if the actual size of the market is smaller than its expected value, a < a e , and too low if a > a e : In the Technical Appendix we show that the di¤erence between aggregate channel pro…ts under the pro…t-sharing rule and RPM is
18 Note that we have two pro…t distribution variables available ( i and f i ), but the upstream …rm only needs one. As argued above (below Proposition 4), may be superior in order to redistribute pro…t and to ensure that the downstream …rms are operative.
There is no uncertainty if a = a; and in this case RPM and the pro…t-sharing rule naturally yield the same pro…t. However, the larger the span between a and a; the higher the expected pro…ts will be under the pro…t-sharing rule compared to RPM.
Under a two-part tari¤ we …nd that the unit wholesale price equals
Equations (12) and (15) make it clear that the unit wholesale price under certainty and uncertainty are equivalent, except that the latter is based on expected rather than actual market size. With w given by (15) we further have (with superscript T P for two-part tari¤):
Other things equal, the …rst term in (16) implies that the end-user price is too high if a < a e ; and vice versa. Note that this corresponds to the outcome under RPM. However, a two-part tari¤ generally performs better than RPM. To see why, note that the second term in (16) adjusts for the di¤erence between actual and expected demand. Indeed, for s = 0 we have the …rst-best outcome p T P = a=2:
This simply re ‡ects the well-known fact that a two-part tari¤ between an upstream …rm and a downstream monopoly maximizes aggregate pro…t if the unit wholesale price is set equal to the upstream …rm's marginal costs (thus w = 0 for s = 0; c.f.
equation (15)). This is true for any market size, and the downstream …rms will therefore use their pricing discretion to set p T P = a=2: For s ! 1; on the other hand, the downstream …rms have no individual market power. They must therefore set p T P = w = a e =2: On this background it is not surprising that we …nd that a two-part tari¤ is weakly inferior to the pro…t-sharing rule but weakly superior to RPM (see Technical Appendix for a formal proof):
and
For s 2 (0; 1) we thus have E > E T P > E RP M : Intuitively, the pro…t-sharing rule achieves a higher expected pro…t than both RPM and a two-part tari¤, since it (a) fully internalizes the pricing externalities between the downstream …rms, and (b) delegates the pricing decisions completely to the best informed players.
Under RPM there is no delegation of pricing decisions, and this rule yields the lowest pro…t. can be used at stage 1 to achieve the optimal channel outcome in the same way as with zero marginal costs. However, with positive marginal costs, and in particular with positive downstream marginal costs, the monitoring problem arising with pro…t sharing will in practise become more complex (see discussion in the Concluding remarks).
It should be noted that the pro…t-sharing rule is not always superior to RPM and two-part tari¤s. RPM may for instance perform better than the pro…t-sharing rule if the upstream …rm is relatively well informed about the size of the market but uncertain about whether the downstream …rms will tacitly collude when they set end-user prices. Other things equal, such collusive behavior might induce the downstream …rms to set higher prices than those maximizing aggregate channel pro…t. 20 Which vertical restraint that is most e¢ cient from the channel's point of view will thus vary from case to case. 19 In equations (14) and (17) we have implicitly assumed that w and p RP M under two-part tari¤ and RPM, respectively, are su¢ ciently low that the downstream …rm chooses to be operative even if actual demand should be in the neighborhood of a: 20 An appendix with an illustrative example is available from the authors on request.
Market-expanding investments
We now extend the model to allow each downstream …rm to undertake non-contractible market-expanding (or quality-enhancing) investments with potential spillovers. At the outset, it is not clear how one …rm's investments a¤ect sales and pro…ts of the other …rms. The investing …rm's product will typically become relatively more attractive than those of the rivals. Thereby the latter could be harmed. However, there might also be technological or marketing spillovers from an investment such that one …rm's investment is to the bene…t of all the downstream …rms. A given …rm's marketing of ringtones, for instance, is likely to bene…t also other …rms selling ringtone services. We thus open up for both positive and negative spillovers from investments, and let the downstream pro…t function of …rm i be given by
The variable x in (19) denotes the vector of market-expanding investments undertaken by the n downstream …rms, and '(x i ) is the investment cost function. The more a …rm invests, the higher is the demand it faces; @q i =@x i > 0: Investments thus increase the size of the market beyond the initial exogenous market size a: We assume that ' 0 (x i ) > 0, and that it is su¢ ciently convex to satisfy all second-order conditions for a pro…t maximum. It should be noted that if the downstream …rms undertake market-expanding investments, the participation constraint may require setting f i < 0 (slotting fee).
The upstream …rm determines the access conditions at stage 1, and at stage 2 the downstream …rms decide non-cooperatively on end-user prices and investment levels. 21 Without loss of generality, it is now instructive to assume an isoelastoc pro…t-sharing rule. As above, we therefore let (p i ) = i p i i ; where i > 0: At stage 2 the …rst-order condition @ i =@p i = 0 is still given by equation (3), which for convenience is repeated here and where the elasticity i is replaced by i :
Since i does not enter into this …rst-order condition, we argued in the previous section that it did not have any strategic value. Thus i could be used as a pure pro…t distribution parameter, with no in ‡uence on channel performance. This is no longer true when the downstream …rms can make market expanding investments, as we then have:
Downstream …rm i's marginal pro…tability of investing is thus strictly increasing in . In general, aggregate channel pro…t is a hump-shaped function of i ; a too high value of i yields overinvestment, while a too low value yields underinvestment.
As for now, we abstract from uncertainty. Using …xed fees to redistribute pro…ts, the upstream …rm will choose i and i to maximize aggregate channel pro…t, which is given by
To …nd the optimal value of i ; solving @ =@x i = 0 yields
An investment which e.g. increases the quality of good i might a¤ect demand for the other goods negatively, tending to make @q j =@x i < 0. This e¤ect is not taken into account by independent downstream …rms, and could imply that there will be overinvestments in a decentralized market structure compared to what maximizes aggregate channel pro…t. However, if one …rm's investments increase demand for its rivals as well, for instance through technological and marketing spillovers, we have
Analogous to the procedure above, we de…ne ! 
The …rst-order condition @ =@p i = 0 is still given by equation (8), so that = depends on the substitutability between the goods. Clearly, aggregate pro…t is maximized also in the decentralized market structure if it yields the same prices and investment levels as under vertical integration. We can therefore use equations (20) and (23) to …nd that the upstream …rm at stage 1 should set
The intuition for equation (24) Once we introduce uncertainty, RPM and three-part tari¤s may have negative impacts both on pricing and investment decisions compared to the pro…t-sharing rule. To see this, we shall in the remaining part of the paper return to our basic assumption that the upstream …rm does not know the exact value of a. A three-part tari¤ will typically perform better than RPM (cf. the example at the end of Section 3). However, in order to highlight the importance of delegating pricing decisions to the informed players, we restrict our attention to comparing the pro…t-sharing rule and RPM. It should be noted that in the presence of both investments and uncertainty it is not possible to give a unique overall ranking of the alternative vertical restraints.
For most well-behaved demand functions, the end-user price which maximizes total channel pro…t is higher the larger the exogenous size of the market (a). This has two important implications. First, under the pro…t-sharing rule, it implies that d =da = (@ =@p V I ) (@p V I =@a) < 0: This is quite intuitive; the larger the size of the market, the higher the end-user price will be, and the smaller is the optimal size of :
Second, under RPM, it is important to note that the upstream …rm's choice of p RP M has a decisive e¤ect on the downstream …rms'investment levels, since the marginal pro…tability of investing in market expansion is increasing with
22 If the realizationâ is higher than the upstream …rm expected (â > a e ), it will therefore typically be the case that p RP M <p and x RP M <x; wherep andx are the optimal price and investment level if the market size is equal toâ. Likewise, ifâ < a e we typically have p RP M >p and x RP M >x : Put di¤erently, RPM tends to yield too low prices and investment levels when demand is higher than the upstream …rm expected, and vice versa.
The basic problem with RPM is that the pricing decision is made by the upstream …rm rather than by the …rms with hands-on market information. This is in
sharp contrast to what is the case under the pro…t-sharing rule, where the inherent delegation-principle ensures that the downstream …rms choose correct prices for any given market size. The only distorting factor with this rule is that the upstream …rm must choose in order to maximize expected pro…t (this distortion implies that the pro…t-sharing rule cannot achieve …rst-best either). As argued above, should be set at a lower value the larger the exogenous market size (d =da < 0). When the upstream …rm has to set based on the expectation of market demand, the rule therefore tends to yield too high investments compared to …rst-best if the actual valueâ > a e and too low investments ifâ < a e : However, the crucial feature of the pro…t-sharing rule is that for any given realized market size, the end-user price will be correct from the channel's point of view. 23 Particularly when the exogenous market size di¤ers signi…cantly from its expected value, the pro…t-sharing rule is therefore superior to RPM. To illustrate this, we now turn to a simple example.
Demand uncertainty; RPM versus pro…t-sharing. An example.
To allow the …rms to make market-expanding investments, we modify the utility function in equation (10) to
where a i = a + x i : Each downstream …rm can increase the size of its market by x i units by investing in e.g. marketing. The cost of doing so is given by '(
; where is su¢ ciently large to ensure that all stability and second-order conditions are satis…ed. To make it simple we assume that there are only two …rms (n = 2) and that s = 2=3. We further assume that the upstream …rm believes that a = 2; 3 or 4 with equal probabilities: 23 The realized market size is the sum of the exogenous market size and the expansion caused by investments.
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the e¢ ciency of the pro…t-sharing rule in delegating pricing decisions to informed market players. Table 2 The …rst thing to note from Table 2 is that RPM fails completely if a = 2; the upstream …rm makes a larger pro…t by setting a relatively high value of p RP M and accept that the market will not be served for such a low market demand. Then the industry will not be operative at all, and the loss of pro…t relative to the case with no uncertainty is 100 %. The pro…t-sharing rule, on the other hand, fares relatively well; the pro…t is only 3.4 % lower than what would have been achievable under certainty. Such di¤erences in the ability to handle market uncertainty can clearly be decisive for whether emerging and potentially pro…table industries take o¤.
If a = 3 or a = 4; the industry is operative both under RPM and the pro…t-sharing rule, but the latter still performs signi…cantly better. Consistent with the discussion above, it can be shown that the …rms underinvest compared to industry optimum under RPM when a > a e , while they overinvest under the pro…t-sharing rule. However, the overinvestment in the latter case has a comparatively small impact on industry pro…tability, since the downstream …rms can adjust the end-user price correspondingly. Indeed, unlike what is the case under RPM, the downstream …rms make the correct investments under the pro…t-sharing rule for any realized market size (a + x in our notation). This is why the last row in Table 2 shows that the expected pro…t loss under pro…t sharing in our example is as small as 0.8 %, compared to 15.5 % under RPM. As a comparison, it can be shown that the expected pro…t loss under a three-part tari¤ is 1.3 %, and that the industry is operative also in the low-demand state. However, this will not be the case if the demand uncertainty is su¢ ciently large.
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Concluding remarks
A major problem in many network industries is that …rms may end up with destructive competition because they produce relatively close substitutes. This may prevent the …rms from undertaking investments which could bene…t the industry in aggregate. Such an outcome can be avoided by implementing a pro…t-sharing rule which reduces the downstream …rms'perceived elasticity of demand.
The market in the case at hand, content messaging such as ringtones, may not be economically important as such. However, we believe that in general it is often the case that downstream …rms have better demand information than upstream …rms.
In the paper we have illustrated why the price-dependent pro…t-sharing rule may then be superior to two-part tari¤s, and two-part tari¤s superior to RPM.
25 24 As emphasized above, we cannot undertake a unique overall ranking between RPM, pro…t-sharing and three-part tari¤s when we have both demand uncertainty and investments. Examples can be constructed where three-part tari¤s yield the higher pro…t, but we have not been able to …nd cases where RPM performs better than the other two schemes we have considered. 25 According to Blair and Lafontaine (2005) the majority of revenue/pro…t sharing rules within franchising specify a constant percentage fee to the franchisor and the franchisee, respectively. Blair and Lafontaine emphasize, however, that contracts where the percentage rate itself is a function of sales levels are used. Contracts where the royalty rate declines or increases as outlet sales reach speci…c target levels are observed, and this type of non-linearity in franchising contracts has become more common (Blair and Lafontaine (2005, pp. 62-63) .
In general, a limitation of pro…t sharing is the costs of monitoring the retailer's revenue (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005 , Mortimer, 2008 , and Dana and Spier, 2001 ).
However, in the present case, this problem is rarely signi…cant, since the upstream mobile provider collects the revenue from the end users. Another practical merit of pro…t sharing schemes in markets with low marginal costs is that pro…t sharing in that case approaches revenue sharing. In most situations it is easier to monitor retail revenue than retail pro…t.
Throughout we have assumed an upstream monopoly, and upstream competition may be a valuable extension of our model. Introducing upstream competition á la McGuire and Staelin (1983) is quite straightforward in the present context. We will then have n manufacturer-retailer pairs o¤ering imperfect substitutes to the endusers. In this environment a price-dependent pro…t sharing rule will be a superior tool to soften downstream competition compared to a two-part tari¤ (a combination of a unit wholesale price and a …xed fee) also under full information. 26 We would emphasize that the ranking between the pro…t-sharing rule, RPM Homothetic utility functions generate demand functions of the form
where p is an n-vector of prices, y is total expenditure on the n goods, and f k (p)
is homogeneous of degree 1 in prices. Consider an arbitrary state of the world A;
where demand for good i and j is given by q
We then have
Consider another arbitrary state B; where q
With homothetic utility we have q (but not necessary) condition for allowing us to choose t such that tp B = p A is that we in any given state have p 1 = ::::p n . In a symmetric equilibrium we consequently …nd
Q.E.D.
Calculation of expected pro…t in absence of investments
Expected pro…t under RPM 27 Holmstrom (1979), Basu, Lal, Srinivasan and Staelin (1985) , and Jeuland and Shugan (1983) , among others, analyze moral hazard problems in manufacturer-retailer channel structures, while Demski and Sappington (1984) , Lal and Staelin (1986) , Desai (2000) and Desai and Srinivasan (1995) , among others, analyze channel coordination problems in presence of adverse selection problems.
With a uniformly distributed on [a; a] ; expected pro…ts under RPM are equal to
where q i is given by equation (7).
Solving (A1) we …nd a unique symmetric equilibrium with
Expected pro…t under a two-part tari¤
Under a two-part tari¤, the pro…t level of each downstream …rm is equal to
Solving @ i =@p i = 0 simultaneously for the n downstream …rms we arrive at a symmetric equilibrium with
Expected channel pro…ts from the upstream …rm's point of view is now given by
Solving (A2) yields
which implies that
In the main text we have assumed that n = 2: Equation (12), which shows the unit wholesale price under certainty, is found by setting n = 2 and a e = a into equation (A3). Equations (14), (15) and (16) are similarly found by setting n = 2 into (A3), (A4) and (A5).
Note that
The two-part tari¤ scheme under uncertainty thus performs better the smaller the number of downstream …rms; E T P will thus be lower than the one shown in the main text if n > 2 (and will thus perform even worse compared to the pro…t-sharing rule). However, the qualitative result that E > E T P > E RP M holds for any value of n:
6.3 Calculation of potential pro…t and the corresponding pro…t-sharing rule
Using the utility function given by equation (24) to solve @U=@q i p i = 0 for n = 2, we …nd that consumer demand equals
where a i = a + x i : We thus have
Equation (A6) also implies that
The cost of market-expanding investments is equal to '(x i ) = ( =2) x 2 i : Assuming that is su¢ ciently large to ensure a unique and symmetric equilibrium, it follows from (A6) that q = (a + x p)=2: We can thus rewrite …rst-order conditions (8) and 
Aggregate channel pro…t is equal to
Using equations (9), (23), (A8) and (A9) with s = 2=3 we have = 1 and = 4 1 4 a :
The upstream …rm thus ensures that the two competing downstream …rms choose prices and investment levels that maximize aggregate pro…t by using the pro…t-
In order to calculate potential pro…t in Table 2 , we have used (A10) with = 2:
6.4 Calculation of the pro…t-sharing rule under uncertainty
At stage 2 the downstream …rms know actual demand. Solving @ i =@p i = 0 and @ i =@x i = 0 for n = 2 and then imposing symmetry we …nd respectively (2 s) p +1 4x (1 s) = 0 and 2 (1 s) (1 + ) (a + x) p (2 (1 s) + 4 3s) = 0:
In the following we shall assume that s = 2=3:
we can solve the …rst-order conditions to …nd explicit solutions for the price and investment level:
Let v(k) denote the upstream …rm's probability that the exogenous demand parameter is equal to a(k); k = 1; :::; m: 29 Evaluated at these probabilities expected pro…t is given by
where q(a(k)) can be found by inserting for p(a (k)) and x(a (k)) into equation (A6).
With = 1 the upstream …rm will at stage one solve^ = arg max E v (~ ) = P m k=1 v(k) (k): With the example used in Table 2 
To calculate expected potential pro…t, we may imagine that we have a stage 0 where demand is uncertain, while actual demand is revealed at stage 1. The latter means that the upstream …rm knows actual demand when it sets and : At stage 0, expected potential pro…ts thereby equal 2
; where q (k); p (k) and x (k) are given from equations (A6) and (A9) and are the pro…t maximizing values for each market size.
Calculation of RPM under uncertainty
Under RPM the pro…t level of downstream …rm i equals i = 
With n = 2 we know from equation (A7) that
, and solving @ i =@x i = 0 we …nd
The important lesson from equation (A14) is that apart from the exogenous parameters s and ; the marginal pro…tability of investing in market expansion is completely determined through the upstream …rm's choice of p i and i : The investment incentives are in particular independent of the market size a; once p i and i are determined. Thus, the upstream …rm faces no uncertainty with respect to the downstream …rms'investment levels, and expected channel pro…t from the upstream …rm's point of view at stage 1 can thus be written as
As before, v(k) is the upstream …rm's perceived probability for a = a(k): Solving Unlike what is the case under the pro…t-sharing rule -where the downstream …rms can react to actual market demand -we see that RP M is independent of a:
This re ‡ects the fact that RP M can only be used to adjust for the competitive pressure between the downstream …rms.
Inserting for p RP M and RP M we further …nd
Investments are thus proportional to expected market size, instead of being dependent on the actual size of the market. All adjustments to actual demand (a act ) being di¤erent from expected demand will therefore take place through the quantities sold:
q(a(k)) = a act (4 1) ( P m k=1 v(k)a(k)) (2 1) 2 (4 1) :
Expected pro…ts are equal to
while actual channel pro…ts in each state are equal to (a(k)) = 2p RP M q(a(k))
Some comments on the calculation of RPM in Table 2 Using the example in Table 2 , we …nd that the upstream …rm makes a higher pro…t by accepting that the market will not be served if a = 2: The upstream …rm will 30 From equation (A9) we know that this price is given by p = therefore at the outset be aware of the fact that the industry will be inoperative if a = 2; and will use this information to obtain higher pro…ts. More precisely, this means that the upstream …rm solves p RP M = arg max (a(3)):
Upstream competition
In the main text we have assumed that we have a monopoly upstream …rm. As argued in Section 2 the actual upstream …rms are not competitors in the market which motivated the paper. Now we introduce upstream competition in a way that resembles the decentralized market structure in McGuire and Staelin (1983) . There are two upstream …rms (manufacturers) and two downstream …rms (retailers), and the two manufacturers produce di¤erentiated but competing products. Manufacturer mi distributes its products through retailer ri, where i = 1; 2. We thus have two competing channels, labeled ch1 and ch2. This may be considered as the polar case to the assumption of upstream monopoly made in the basic model. So how does the pro…t-sharing rule perform relative to a two-part tari¤ as considered by
McGuire and Staelin? For the sake of the argument, we assume that all players have accurate demand information. To simplify we use the Shubik-Levitan demand function speci…ed in (10), where n = 2. At stage 1 manufacturer mi decides the wholesale contract towards ri, and we assume that mi o¤ers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to ri. At stage 2 the retailers compete in prices.
As a benchmark we consider the case where the manufacturers use a two-part tari¤ as in McGuire and Staelin (1983) . At stage 2 ri decides p i in order to maximize ri = (p i w i ) q i f i , and it is straightforward to show that the stage 2 equilibrium price p i is given by Inserting for into (A16) we …nd p P S = a s p 1 s (1 s) .
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The di¤erence in prices under the pro…t-sharing rule and RPM is given by and p P S = p T P for s = 0 and s = 1: Thus, the pro…t-sharing rule yields higher prices than a two-part tari¤ if the downstream …rms produce imperfect substitutes. Since it further is straight forward to show that p P S is smaller than the cartel price (
), it follows that the pro…t-sharing rule yields higher pro…ts than a two-part tari¤ if s 2 (0; 1) :
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